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CASE COMMENTS

MILKOVICH v LORAIN JOURNAL Co.: THE BALANCE Tips

IS A NEWSPAPER exempt from liability for defamation if it
publishes statements of "opinion" as opposed to "fact?" The Supreme Court considered this question in Milkovich v Lorain
Journal Co.1 and answered it in the negative. A 7-2 majority of
the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that no
"constitutional privilege for 'opinion' is required to ensure the
freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment."'2 After refusing to exempt the newspaper from liability for defamation
based on the statements at issue and finding that the statements
do "imply an assertion that
Milkovich perjured himself in a
judicial proceeding," ' the case was remanded for further
consideration. 4
Even the Supreme Court described the Milkovich case as an
"odyssey of litigation."5 The case had its origin in February 1974,
when the Mentor, Ohio, High School wrestling team visited Maple Heights, Ohio, for a match with the Maple Heights High
School wrestling team. During the match, an altercation took
place following a referee's controversial call. A number of specta1. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
2. Id. at 2707.
3. Id.
4. Milkovich and the newspaper have settled the case for an undisclosed amount "of
more than $100,000." Mahoney, News-Herald, Coach Settle 16-year-old Libel Suit, Plain
Dealer (Cleveland), March 30, 1991, § 2 (Metro), at 2, col. 1.
5. Id. at 2698.
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tors and wrestlers were involved in the altercation and several people were injured. The Ohio High School Athletic Association
("OHSAA") held a series of hearings to investigate the event and
issued "sanctions against the Maple Heights team, including a
disqualification from the state tournament, a one-year probationary status, and a censuring of" Michael Milkovich, the Maple
Heights High School varsity wrestling coach.6
A group consisting of Maple Heights wrestling team members and their parents challenged the suspension in the Franklin
County, Ohio, Court of Common Pleas.' They alleged that the
OHSAA hearings failed to provide adequate procedural safeguards before depriving team members of their property right to
compete in state competition. The court ruled for the wrestlers
and parents and reinstated the Maple Heights team in the state
competition."
The day following the court ruling, the News-Herald9 sports
section published a column, written by J. Theodore Diadiun, entitled "'Maple beat the law with the 'big lie.' "10 Diadiun's column
included a number of passages which formed the basis for the action by Milkovich. In sum, Milkovich claimed that in these
passages Diadiun accused him of committing perjury at the OHSAA hearing.
Milkovich initiated a defamation action against the Lorain
Journal Company and Diadiun in the Lake County, Ohio, Court
of Common Pleas. The court granted the defendants' motion for a
directed verdict at the close of Milkovich's case, finding that
Milkovich had failed to show by clear and convincing evidence
that the defendants had published the column with "knowledge of
its falsity or with reckless disregard as to its truth."'" The Court
of Appeals reversed, finding that "any news article
that is
published knowing that it conflicts with a judicial determination

6. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15 Ohio St. 3d 292, 292, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1192
(1984).
7. Id. (citing Barrett v. Ohio High School Athletic Ass'n, No. 74 Civ. 09-3390
(Jan. 7, 1975)).
8. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 65 Ohio App. 2d 143, 145, 416 N.E.2d 662,
664 (1979).
9. The News-Herald is a daily newspaper owned by the Lorain Journal Company.
It circulates in Lake County, Ohio, the home of Mentor High.School. Milkovich, 110 S.
Ct. at 2698.
10. Id.
1I. Milkovich, 65 Ohio App. 2d at 144, 416 N.E.2d at 664. See generally New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (establishing actual malice standard).
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of the truth, may
be regarded as a reckless disregard of the
truth so as to constitute 'actual malice,' ",12 and remanded the case
for a factual determination of the 'actual malice' question. The
appeal by the defendants to the Ohio Supreme Court was dismissed for failing to present a "substantial constitutional question." 13 The Supreme Court of the United States denied
certiorari. 14
On remand, the trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants, this time on the grounds that Diadiun's
statements were opinions, and therefore were constitutionally protected, and alternately that Milkovich, as a public figure, had
failed to meet the "actual malice" test required for recovery 16
This time, the Court of Appeals affirmed both grounds for the
decision. " ' The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, however, finding
that the statements in question were "factual assertions," 1 7 not
constitutionally protected opinions, and that Milkovich was
neither a public official nor a public figure for the purpose of First
Amendment analysis."' The Supreme Court of the United States
again denied certiorari.1 9
The Lake County Court of Common Pleas delayed its consideration of the case while Scott v News-Herald,2 0 a libel action
growing out of the same Diadiun article, was argued before the
Ohio Supreme Court. When that court reversed itself, now finding
the Diadiun article to consist of statements of opinion and not of
fact,2 ' the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants in the Milkovich case on the same grounds. 2 The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court,2 3 and the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed Milkovich's ensuing appeal.2 4 The
plaintiff's petition for certiorari to Supreme Court of the United

12. Milkovich, 65 Ohio App. 2d at 148, 416 N.E.2d at 666.
13. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct at 2700.
14. Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 449 U.S. 966 (1980). Justice Brennan wrote a
lengthy dissent.

15.

Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2700.

16.
17.

Id.
Milkovich, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 298, 473 N.E.2d at 1196-97.

18. Id. at 297, 473 N.E.2d at 1196.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953 (1985).
25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986).
Id. at 249-54, 496 N.E.2d at 705-09.
Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2701.
Milkovich v. News-Herald, 46 Ohio App. 3d 20, 545 N.E.2d 1320 (1989).
Milkovich, I 10 S. Ct. at 2701.
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States, raising the question "how should defamatory statements be
analyzed to determine whether they are assertions of fact or ex26
25
pressions of opinion," was granted.
The Supreme Court held for Milkovich, but it did so on a
more sweeping basis than he had proposed. The Court held that
statements of opinion receive no special exemption from liability
for defamation. This comment will examine the reasoning that led
the Court to this conclusion, concluding that the Court's reasoning
is inadequate and that the holding represents a narrowing of the
first amendment guarantee of freedom of expression.

I. BACKGROUND
At common law, an action for defamation protected a person's interest in reputation. Such an action had two aspects: protection of the pecuniary, property-like interest in the value of
one's reputation to further one's business and employment and
protection of one's intangible interest "involving personality and
human dignity "27 An action for defamation would allege that either or both of those interests had been injured by the publication
of false statements that were "sufficiently derogatory
as to
cause harm to [one's] reputation, so as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating
or dealing with him." A defamatory statement of opinion was
actionable at common law 29
In New York Times Co. v Sullivan,"° the Supreme Court
found that the Constitution limits the reach of defamation law
The Court held that a public official may not recover "damages
for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless
he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice' that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not." 1 Any lower standard, according
to the Court, would jeopardize the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be unin-

25. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct.
2695 (1990) (No. 89-645).
26. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 863 (1990).
27. L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 2 (1978).

28.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

29.
30.
31.

Id.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 279-80.

§ 566 comment a (1977).
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hibited, robust, and wide-open." 3 2
The New York Times standard was subsequently applied to
"public figures" as well as "public officials" in Curtis Publishing
Co. v Butts.33 Chief Justice Warren and those joining his concurrence 34 found that two social changes since the 1930s and World
War II justified this extension: the growth of large concentrations
of nongovernment power in industry and the "ready access [public
figures, like public officials, have to] mass media of communicapolicy and to counter criticism of their
tion, both to influence
35
views and activities.1
The Supreme Court continued its consideration of types of
defamation plaintiffs, moving from the public official and public
figure to the private individual in Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc.38
Gertz provided some constitutional protection for defendants in
defamation suits brought by private individuals but did not require the New York Times level of protection. Instead, the Court
left the determination of the appropriate standard of liability to
the states, "so long as they do not impose liability without
fault. '37 The Court reasoned that private individuals do not have
the same ease of access to the mass media through which they
might rebut defamatory remarks as do public officials and public
figures. Moreover, private individuals have not "thrust themselves
to the forefront of particular public controversies" 38 as have public
officials and public figures, who, therefore, volunteer for media
scrutiny The Court concluded that the requirement of fault adequately balances the interest in a bold press and the interest in
redressing reputational injury
The Supreme Court has also held that the Constitution "requir[es] that the plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity, as

32. Id. at 270.
33. 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
34. The Court's decision in Butts was written by Justice Harlan but joined by only
three other justices. Chief Justice Warren wrote a concurring opinion joined by four other
justices in extending the New York Times standard to "public figures." Id. (Warren, C.J.,
concurring).
35. Id. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
36. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Supreme Court had considered private individual defamation plaintiffs previously but failed to announce an opinion that a majority of justices
were willing to sign. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), overruled in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 333 (reviewing the several Rosenbloom opinions and their antecedents).

37. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
38. Id. at 345.
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well as fault, before recovering damages" for defamation from a

media defendant."9 The Court recognized that placing such a burden on the plaintiff, rather than requiring the defendant to show
truth as at common law,4° would protect some speech which is
false. This result was necessary, however, in order to encourage

robust public debate.
In another line of cases, the Court has found "constitutional

limits on the type of speech which may be the subject of state
defamation actions. ' 41 The Court has protected the use of "rhe4
43
torical hyperbole, '42 "loose, figurative" language, and sarcasm. 1
These types of speech share an intent to communicate a meaning
other than the literal denotation of the terms used. Whether it is
the word choice itself, the surrounding context, or the inherent
outrageousness of the words used, the reader is on notice to look
beyond the immediate denotation of the words to reach the author's intended meaning. The Constitution requires that a pub-

lisher of such passages not be held liable for an unintended
message.

Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized additional constitutional protection of a procedural nature for those defending def-

amation actions. An appellate court must make an independent
review of the entire record when the plaintiff is a public official or
public figure. This is to assure that the factual finding of "actual

malice" is justified.45

39.

Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986).
40. See F HARPER, F JAMES & O. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.20, at 169 (2d ed.
1986) (truth was an affirmative defense at common law).
41. Milkovich, I1I0
S. Ct. at 2704. (emphasis in original).
42. See Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970). In
Greenbelt, the Supreme Court held that the use of the word "blackmail" would be understood by "even the most careless reader" to refer to acts other than those literally denoted
by the term. Id. at 14.
43. See Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418
U.S. 264 (1974). In Letter Carriers, the Court found the use of the term "traitor," when
describing a person in the context of a union labor dispute, not to be defamatory. Id. at
284. In that context, the term was merely "an expression of
contempt." Id. at 286.
44. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). The Court found an
"outrageous" parody was not defamatory because it "'was not reasonably believable.'" Id.
at 57 (quoting Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1278 (4th Cir. 1986)).
45. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514
(1984) (holding that the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is not the standard of review in cases governed by New York Times).
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II. Milkovich v Lorain Journal Co.
A. The Majority Opinion

The majority opinion begins with a brief sketch of the history
of the case and a complete reprint of the Diadiun column, the
source of the allegedly defamatory statements."

The majority

opinion proceeds to give an overview of the history of the common
law of defamation,47 followed by a sketch of the significant cases
establishing the constitutional limitations on state defamation

laws.48
Chief Justice Rehnquist then begins his analysis by framing
the issue as whether the Court will add a "protection for defamatory statements which are categorized as 'opinion' as opposed to
'fact'" to the constitutional protections already extended to defendants in defamation suits. 49 The newspaper argued that the
Court should recognize such a protection and supported this pro-

position with a well-known passage from Gertz:
"Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false
idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for
its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on

46. The majority also quoted nine passages cited by Milkovich as accusing him of
the crime of perjury and "damag[ing him] directly in his life-time occupation of coach and
teacher, and constitut[ing] libel per se." Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2699-700.
[A] lesson was learned (or relearned) yesterday by the student body of Maple
Heights High School, and by anyone who attended the Maple-Mentor wrestling
meet of last Feb. 8.
"A lesson which, sadly, in view of the events of the past year, is well they
learned early.
"It is simply this: If you get in a jam, lie your way out.
"If you're successful enough, and powerful enough, and can sound sincere
enough, you stand an excellent chance of making the lie stand up, regardless of
what really happened.
"The teachers responsible were mainly head Maple wrestling coach Mike
Milkovich and former superintendent of schools H. Donald Scott.
"Anyone who attended the meet, whether he be from Maple Heights, Mentor, or impartial observer, knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at
the hearing after each having given his solemn oath to tell the truth.
"But they got away with it.
"Is that the kind of lesson we want our young people learning from their
high school administrators and coaches?
"I think not."
Id. at 2698.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 30-45.
49. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705.
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the competition of other ideas. But
there is no constitutional
50
value in false statements of fact."
Surprisingly, the Court held that this passage did not create a
wholesale exemption for statements of opinion, instead viewing it
as merely a restatement of the familiar "'marketplace of ideas'
concept." 51 The majority cites with approval the reasoning from a
Second Circuit opinion which argues that only false statements
which can be corrected by entering the "marketplace" are worthy
of constitutional protection from defamation laws.5
The Court then examines the statement, "'In my opinion
John Jones is a liar.' ",5" Such a statement of opinion implies the
existence of underlying facts which justify the opinion. If these
underlying facts were explicitly stated, and were incorrect or incomplete, they could cause damage to Jones's reputation. If they
did so, they would certainly be actionable under state defamation
law If the Court were to recognize an exemption for statements
of opinion, a writer could escape liability for defamation by explicitly labeling a statement one of opinion as opposed to one of
fact. The Court is simply unwilling to recognize such a broad exemption, especially since so many constitutional protections for
potentially defamatory statements have already been recognized. 4
by referring
The majority opinion goes on to emphasize this point
55
once again to the line of cases described above.
After denying the statements written by Diadiun an exemption from liability as "opinions," the majority then examined the
statements to determine if they "imply an assertion that
Milkovich perjured himself in a judicial proceeding,"" as this became the dispositive question in the action. The Court held that a

50. Id. (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974)). While
this language was only dicta in the Gertz case, a number of federal courts had relied on it
to exempt statements of opinion from liability for defamation. See, e.g., Mr. Chow v. Ste.
Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1985); Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 974
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
51. Milkovich, I10 S. Ct. at 2705 (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
52. Id. at 2705 (citing Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 62 n.10
(2d Cir. 1980)). The Cianci court quotes the Gertz example of an idea which can never be
proven false - Thomas Jefferson's argument from his Inaugural Address for "freedom for
those 'who would wish to dissolve this Union or change its republican form.'" Ciancl, 639
F.2d at 62 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 n.8).
53. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705.
54. Id. at 2706.
55. See Id. at 2706-07. See generally supra text accompanying notes 30-45.
56. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707.
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fact-finder might find that Diadiun implied this assertion and so
case to the Ohio courts for further consideration on
remanded the
57
matter.
this
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Brennan's dissent, joined by Justice Marshall, begins
by agreeing with the majority's statement of legal principles. The
dissent joins the majority in finding no "opinion privilege wholly
in additionto the protections" already enumerated by the Court.58
However, Justice Brennan makes explicit what had only been implied in the majority opinion: a statement of "pure opinion," that
is, one which does not explicitly state or imply assertions of fact,
cannot be proven false. 59 Therefore, under the Hepps standard,"0 a
plaintiff would necessarily fail to carry the burden of demonstrating falsity Media defendants, at least, cannot be held liable for
statements of "pure" opinion.6 '
The dissent then considers how implications of fact can be
distilled from statements of opinion. Justice Brennan distinguishes
statements of opinion which might reasonably be found to imply
defamatory assertions of fact from those that do not. As an example of those that might imply defamatory assertions, he cites the
majority's statement, "'In my opinion John Jones is a liar' standing alone."62 A reasonable reader could justifiably infer that
the speaker must have some basis in fact for such an assertion.
But a statement of opinion which is explicitly conjectural and sets
out the totality of facts on which it is based, none of which is false
or defamatory in itself, cannot be defamatory so long as the
speaker sincerely holds the belief published. 3

57. Id.
58. Id. at 2708 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. Id. (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
60. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) (plaintiff
must prove falsity); supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
61. Justice Brennan refers to the Court's refusal, in Hepps, to decide whether the
rule of that case would apply to a nonmedia defendant. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2708 n.2
(Brennan, J.,dissenting).
62. Id. at 2709-10 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
63. The example from the Restatement (Second) of Torts is most clear:
"A writes to B about his neighbor C: 'He moved in six months ago. He works
downtown, and I have seen him during that time only twice, in his backyard
around 5:30 seated in a deck chair with a portable radio listening to a news
broadcast, and with a drink in his hand. I think he must be an alcoholic."
Milkovwch, 110 S. Ct. at 2710 n.3 (Brennan, J.,dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEC-
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Justice Brennan then moves to an analysis of Diadiun's statements about Milkovich under these principles and concludes that
"[n]o reasonable reader could understand Diadiun to be impliedly
64
asserting - as fact - that Milkovich had perjured himself.
Diadiun used qualifiers such as "seemed," "probably," and "apparently" to alert the reader to the conjectural nature of his statements. Justice Brennan also points to the tone of the article as a
whole - clearly that of a partisan - and its format as a signed
editorial to further signal the reader that its statements are not
factual assertions but conjecture. Justice Brennan concludes that
"[r]eaders of Diadiun's column are signaled repeatedly that the
author does not actually know what Milkovich said at the court
hearing and that the author is surmising, from factual premises
made explicit in the column, that Milkovich must have lied in
court." 5
Finally, the dissent refers to the policy justifications for permitting such conjecture to escape liability for defamation. The
quality of public discourse and the effectiveness of the democratic
process are furthered by such conjecture. 6

III.

ANALYSIS

The majority opinion in Milkovich v Lorain Journal Co.,
stripped of its summaries of facts, history, and doctrine, contains a
mere four paragraphs of analysis. 67 Here, the Gertz dicta regarding the opinion exemption is quoted, criticized, and rejected.
These paragraphs are the heart of the majority opinion, but they
are disingenuous, simplistic, and represent a major setback for
first amendment freedom of expression.
The majority states the rule that there is no constitutionally
compelled exemption from liability for defamation for statements
of opinion.6 8 But the Court fails to account for its own role in
creating and perpetuating the widespread understanding that such
an exemption exists.

comment c (1977)).
64. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2711 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 2713 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

OND) OF TORTS § 566

66. Id. at 2714. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. These are the four paragraphs beginning with the sentence: "Respondents would
have us recognize, in addition to the established safeguards discussed above, still another
First Amendment-based protection for defamatory statements which are categorized as
,opinion' as opposed to 'fact.'" Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705-06.
68. Id. at 2705.
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The majority'finds that the Gertz dictae "was [not] intended
to create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that
might be labeled an 'opinion.' ,o On its face, however, the Gertz
language seems clear. Opinions, even those that cause great injury, do not provide grounds for legal redress through defamation
actions. Those who are defamed by expressions of opinion must
repair their reputations and seek relief through the public exchange of competing opinions.
The clear language of Gertz itself is not the only reason to
believe the Court intended to create an opinion exemption. The
Court's first amendment jurisprudence, beginning with New York
Times Co. v Sullivan 1 in 1964, had expanded the protection
given to defamation defendants.7 2 In the New York Times-ButtsGertz line of cases, protection was given to defendants whose
statements were, or might have been, both false and defamatory
In the Greenbelt-HustlerMagazine-Letter Carriersline, the context of statements was taken into account to provide reason to
deny those statements their false and defamatory superficial
meaning. The Gertz "opinion exemption" fits comfortably into either line. On the one hand, it might have been read as a further
protection for media defendants. On the other hand, it might have
been viewed as another protection based on the reasonable
reader's understanding of the author's non-defamatory message.
The Gertz dicta, therefore, is entirely consistent with the general
trend of expanding the protection afforded defendants in defamation actions. The "opinion exemption" stated there may very well
have been intended to mean exactly what it says.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court itself has made reference to
the Gertz dicta without suggesting that it meant anything less
than it appears to mean. On the same day Gertz was handed
down, the Court quoted its language in the Letter Carrierscase,
disposing of a defamation claim that the epithet "scab," in the
context of a union dispute, could be understood to imply that its
subject had "rotten principles." 7' The Court found that the word
was "used
in a loose, figurative sense.
Expression of

69. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974); see also supra text
accompanying note 51 (quoting Gertz).
70. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705.
71. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
72. See supra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
73. Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418
U.S. 264, 283 (1974).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Val. 41:613

such an opinion, even in the most pejorative terms, is protected
under federal labor law,' 7 4 and then cited the Gertz dicta. 75 More
recently, in Hustler Magazine v Falwell, another opinion written
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court commented that "[a]t the
heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions
The
76
idea.
'false'
a
as
thing
such
no
recognizes
Amendment
First
After holding that the Gertz language was not meant to, and
did not, create an "opinion exemption," the Court went on to offer
two justifications for not creating the exemption at this time. The
first is that only some, but not all, opinions would be welcome in
"the marketplace of ideas." According to the Court,,the marketplace provides a place only for "'the sort of thing that could be
corrected by discussion.' ",7 The Court, unfortunately, does not
explicate the basis for its theory of correction by the marketplace.
The Court may be suggesting that opinions, as statements of value
or personal belief, are neither true nor false. Since a statement of
opinion makes no claim that it is true for all, "the test of truth"
provided by the market is superfluous; opinions are not susceptible
of correction. Having explained that the Gertz dicta merely restates Holmes's classic marketplace metaphor, the Court leaves
questions regarding the relative place of fact and opinion in the
market unanswered.
The majority's analysis of the marketplace then continues on
78
to a discussion of opinions that "impl[y] a knowledge of facts."1
The majority implicitly suggests that opinions that do not imply
the knowledge of any facts may be exempt from defamation liability since they cannot be proven false.79 The objectionable feature
of those unprotected statements of opinion is, simply, that an opinion may imply a defamatory and false assertion of fact. "Simply
couching such statements in terms of opinion does not dispel these
implications.
'In my opinion Jones is a liar,' can cause as

74. Id. at 284.
75. Id.
76. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1988) (citing Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974)).
77. Milkovich, 110 S.Ct. at 2705 (quoting Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639
F.2d 54, 62 n.10 (2d Cir. 1980)).
78. Id. at 2705-06.
79. Justice Brennan makes this implication explicit when he states that the Court
"determines [today] that a protection for statements of pure opinion is dictated by existing
First Amendment doctrine." Id. at 2708 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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much damage to reputation as the statement, 'Jones is a liar.' ,,s0
This is a questionable proposition, particularly as the basis
for denying constitutional protection to such a common and valuable form of speech as "opinion." The reasonable reader will treat
statements of opinion more critically than statements of fact, having been alerted to their personal or value basis. In addition to
examining with a skeptical eye the leap from fact to judgment,
such a reader will wonder if the opinion's publisher has seen the
"facts" through a lens distorted by the opinion. The Court has
already held that publishers are to be granted the freedom to express their metaphoric, sarcastic, and hyperbolic opinions, so long
as the reasonable reader would conclude that the author did not
intend to be taken literally Having already granted the reader the
ability to glean the author's intent in other rhetorical settings, the
Court should have considered doing so in the setting of
"opinions." 81

Justice Brennan's dissent is only a partial solution to the
opinion problem. He succeeds in rescuing the "pure" opinion from
liability on the basis of established first amendment doctrine. But
his dissent inadvertently demonstrates the need for an opinion exemption even while he agrees with the majority opinion in rejecting it. He carefully analyzes the statements alleged to be defamatory and finds that Diadiun's use of qualifying language and
the context of the article as a whole signal the reasonable reader
that no facts are asserted, only conjecture.8 2 The seven member
majority arrives quickly at the opposite conclusion.83 Justice Brennan's approach, less obviously but just as surely as the majority's,
will permit the lower courts to seek out the facts, whether explicit,
implied, or connoted, of an opinion. The specter of liability arises
when any of these facts prove false and defamatory Without the
protection of a wholesale exemption for opinions, only foolhardy
editorialists will give full vent to their ideas. The result can only
be a less robust public debate.
The impact of Milkovich is already being felt. For example,

80. Id. at 2706.
81. It is ironic that the reader is considered able to distinguish metaphor and hyperbole from assertions of fact and to understand their "truthfulness" but is not granted the
same abilities when confronted by an opinion explicitly labeled as such. Parodists are protected by the Hustler Magazine decision, but editorialists who carefully describe the basis
for their opinions, such as Diadiun, are denied that protection by Milkovich.
82. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2710-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. Id.at 2707
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the New York Times is currently being sued by Dan Moldea, the
author of Interference: How Organized Crime Influences Professional Football. Moldea alleges that the Times libelled him in
"falsely portray[ing] him as a sloppy and incompetent journalist"84 in its review of his book. Taken as a whole, the review is
clearly opinion. But Milkovich has encouraged Moldea to go forward in his suit in the hope of finding false and defamatory facts
explicitly or impliedly included in the review The Moldea action
is only one of "a spate of state and federal lawsuits [which] have
cropped up to take advantage of [the Milkovich decision.]" 85
The Milkovich Court faced a delicate question, one involving
the competing and worthy claims of protection of reputation and
protection of speech. The Court chose to provide protection to reputation at the expense of opinions which imply false defamatory
facts. Its basis for doing so is not clear from the opinion itself. The
varying interpretations of fact and opinion which will emerge in
the lower courts as a reaction to Milkovich make this an unsettling time for those who publish opinion, and for those who read it
as well.
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